A new version of a 2014 working paper written with Marco Buso et Phuong-Tra Tran (Marco Fanno Working Paper, n°189, Università degli
Studi di Padova, Dipartimento di Scienze Echonomiche ed Aziendali, November 2014) is now on-line.
This new version is published by the EPPP Chair of the Sorbonne Business School.
Buso M., Marty F., and Tran P.T., (2016), "Public-Private Partnerships from Budget Constraints:
Looking for Debt Hiding?", Working Paper Chaire EPPP n°2016-01, february 2016, 38p.
http://chaire-eppp.org/files_chaire/working_paper_fevrier_2016.pdf
The
use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to realize and operate public
infrastructures is often associated with fiscal circumventing
motivations. Using data at the municipal level, this paper investigates
whether budget-constrained public authorities adopt PPPs in order to
hide public debts. The results show
that financial di culties often lead to a preference for PPPs instead of traditional forms of public procure-
ment. However, this behavior is not explained by the possibility of debt hiding. We then discuss alternative
explanations for these findings.
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