Le retour des mécanismes de cession-bail / the return of sale and lease back arrangements

Le Monde annonce que le Ministère de la Défense réétudie la possibilité de mettre en oeuvre des montages de cession-bail pour certains de ces équipements ou infrastructures.

http://www.lemonde.fr/economie-francaise/article/2014/12/30/le-ministere-de-la-defense-innove-pour-boucler-son-budget_4547272_1656968.html

Ces montages financiers "innovants" ont une longue histoire - notamment dans le secteur privé - et s'articulent avec des stratégies comptables de déconsolidation de plus en plus contraintes.

voir notamment une contribution commune avec Laurent Vidal dans Droit et Ville

Marty F. et Vidal L., (2005), « Contrat de partenariat et mécanismes financiers de droit privé », Droit et Ville, Revue de l’Institut des Etudes Juridiques de l’Urbanisme et de la Construction, n° 60-2005, pp.264-323, avril 2006.

According to Le Monde the French MoD considers the option to use sale and lease back contracts for some of its equipments or assets. Such financial schemes, already used in the private sector, have a long history and have to be put into perspective with creative public accounting schemes aiming at putting public debt off the balance sheet. However public accounting sector standard tend inexorably to limit such possibilities. 

A paper was written in 2005 with Laurent Vidal on this issue.

Faut-il déréglementer les professions réglementées?

Une contribution dans le prochain numéro des Cahiers Français dans le contexte de la Loi Macron.

« Faut-il déréglementer les professions réglementées ? », Cahiers français, n°384, janvier-février 2015, pp.78-83.

La réglementation de certaines professions, notamment dans les domaines de la santé et du droit, répond principalement au besoin de corriger les asymétries informationnelles et, partant, les défaillances de marché. Récemment relancé, le débat sur les professions réglementées confronte les partisans d’une réglementation publique qui éviterait l’instabilité, l’insécurité, la baisse des compétences des professionnels et de la qualité des services ou produits, aux tenants d’une déréglementation qui ferait baisser les prix et favoriserait la relance de la compétitivité et de l’activité économique. Il s’agit de déterminer les activités qui pourraient être déréglementées et celles justifiant une réglementation. Il convient donc de réfléchir à la place à accorder à l’autorégulation par les ordres professionnels, ce qui n’exclut toutefois pas une régulation externe des pratiques tarifaires.

What Makes Public-Private Partnerships Work? An Economic Analysis

 The Centre Cournot's Prism on PPPs written with Jean Bensaïd is now available in English

http://www.centre-cournot.org/what-makes-public-private-partnerships-work-an-economic-analysis#more-12068

Public-private partnerships are long-term, global, administrative contracts by which a public authority entrusts a private contractor with some or all of the missions of design, construction, funding, operation and maintenance of an infrastructure or the provision of a public service. The private contractor recovers its initial investment and collects revenue for the service provided by means of tolls paid by users (depending on the traffic) or rent paid by the public authority (depending on the availability of the required service and the satisfaction of criteria of quality and performance).

Criticized for their cost, rigidity and lack of transparency, condemned on the basis of a number of failures or difficulties in their implementation, public-private partnerships are nevertheless an appropriate instrument for the realization of certain projects and for the efficient exploitation of public assets and infrastructures. This Prisme presents  a dispassionate analysis of these contracts, highlighting the economic and financial parameters that can lead public authorities to choose this solution within the context of the search for transparency and the need to make efficient use of public moneys.

Private funding may prove to be indispensable, given the constraints currently imposed on public finances, to meet the needs for infrastructure investment. Likewise, the public-private partnership may create an efficient incentive framework to protect the public authority from spiralling costs or delays and to guarantee a service of quality throughout the duration of the contract.

Having said that, these contracts are no magic solution that can be applied to every project or in every situation. This Prisme explains how far and under what conditions the public-private partnership can fulfil its promise. It places particular emphasis on the financial dimension, which is the cornerstone of these contracts in terms of both efficiency and budgetary sustainability. And lastly, it examines the changes undergone by this model, especially those related to funding conditions.

This text was inspired by the presentation 30 Years of Public-Private Partnerships: A Macroeconomic Assessment given by Frédéric Marty and commented by Jean Bensaïd on 20 June 2013 at the Cournot Seminar.

PPPs and off-balance sheet strategies : a new working paper

A working paper on PPPs and accounting tricks with Marco Buso and Tra Tran Phuong  :

“Public Private Partnerships from Budget Constraints: Looking for Debt Hiding?”, avec Buso M. et Phuong T., Marco Fanno Working Paper, n°189, Università degli Studi di Padova, Dipartimento di Scienze Echonomiche ed Aziendali, novembre 2014.

 http://www.economia.unipd.it/sites/decon.unipd.it/files/20140189.pdf

In this paper, we examine whether budget-constrained public authorities are more likely to use a PPP (Public Private Partnership) than traditional procurement methods. Then, we study the possible mechanisms underlying this choice. Our empirical test focuse s on France and consists of a two-stage
approach. First, we examine the impact of budget constraints on the use of PPPs and find a positive relationship. Second, to better delineate the debt hiding effect, we exploit the 2011 changes to the ability to underwrite PPP debts. We find that debt hiding is a relevant, but not a sufficient element
to explain budget-constrained governments’ attitudes towards PPP